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ABSTRACT
Teton Dam failed during its first filling on 5 June 1976. The 405-ft high dam was designed and built using modern standards; therefore its
failure received considerable scrutiny from engineering experts. Failure mechanisms suggested, included hydraulic fracture, internal
erosion, wet-seam theory, and defects in the abutment rock. None of the investigations, however, were able to explain satisfactorily why the
dam breached when the reservoir reached EL.5301.7 ft and only in the vicinity of Sta. 14+00 on the right abutment. The investigation here
is focused on this crucial aspect of the failure using the modern framework of fundamental “state based soil mechanics”. According to this
framework highly compacted soils of low plasticity in an environment of low liquidity index and low confining stress would crack in the
presence of high shear stresses. The impervious core (Zone-1) of Teton was constructed of uniform clayey silt of low plasticity and highly
compacted and therefore was prone to such a possibility. This paper describes the details of the theory, the investigation, and the
conclusions arrived at regarding the potential initiation of Teton failure. Finite element analysis carried out using state based parameters
indicate the presence of deep open transverse vertical crack(s) in the core (Zone-1) to a maximum depth of about 32 ft from the crest only in
the right abutment and in the vicinity of Sta. 14+00. We conclude that once the water level in the reservoir rose above El 5300.0 ft in the
early hours of 5 June 1976 water flowed through the open vertical crack(s), which slowly eroded the crack into a large tunnel leading to the
major breach of the dam hours later.
INTRODUCTION
The 405-ft high Teton dam was located in the high plateau of
southeastern Idaho (Fig. 1). It failed during its first filling on 5
June 1976. The “sunny-day” failure of the dam resulted in 14
fatalities and a very large economic loss. Its failure was one of
the most publicized events at that time involving a large earthfill
dam built using current standards. Therefore, this failure received
considerable attention from engineering experts around the
world. However, the failure assessment and prognosis by experts
including those by the Independent Panel (IP, 1976) and the
Interior Review Group (IRG, 1980) failed to arrive at a
consensus. Failure mechanisms suggested, included hydraulic
fractures, internal erosion, the wet-seam theory, and defects in
the abutment rock. There, however, remained an unanswered
question as to why the dam breached when the reservoir reached
El.5301.7ft and initiated only in the vicinity of Sta.14+00 on the
right abutment.
The impervious core/water barrier (Zone-1) of Teton was
constructed of uniform clayey silt of low plasticity and low
liquidity index. Highly compacted soils of low plasticity tend to
crack in an environment of low liquidity index, low confining
stresses and high shear stresses. None of the previous
investigations focused on the possibility of the presence of
cracks in the upper portions of the dam. Such possibility is
investigated here using the modern concepts of the fundamental
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framework of “state based soil mechanics” (Pillai and
Muhunthan 2001, 2002). The investigation consisted of
laboratory tests on Zone-1 material to determine the physical and
mechanical parameters and finite element analysis conducted
using ABAQUS to simulate the field stress conditions. The
results are used to identify the main cause of the Teton failure.

Fig. 1. Location map of Teton Dam (IP, 1976)
BACKGROUND AND FAILURE OF TETON DAM
The design cross section of the Teton dam at the river valley and
the right abutment are as shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 respectively.
The construction of the dam began in June of 1972 and was
completed in November of 1975. The dam was conservatively
1

designed to have a wide impervious core with a head to width
ratio of about 1.5 (Figs.2 and 3). The bedrock consisted of openjointed rhyolite and basalt but was well treated with blanket and
curtain grouting. The abutment rock was trenched to provide a
large core-rock contact and a long flow path to have a low
seepage gradient (Fig.3).

Fig. 2. Design cross section of the dam at river valley section

Fig. 4. Typical curve of standard proctor compaction for the
Zone-1 material
SURFACE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE DAM FAILURE

Fig. 3. Cross section of the dam at the right abutment
The impervious core (Zone-1) of the dam consisted of clayey
silts of aeolion origin with low plasticity (PI ~ 4) and USCS
classification of CL- ML. As per the design and specifications
Zone-1 material was placed at average water contents of 1.0%
dry of optimum and compacted to a maximum dry density of 98102 % of the Standard Proctor test (Fig. 4). Similarly the support
zone (Zone-2) (chimney filter/drain) was compacted to a high
relative density of the order of 65-70 % (IRG 1980).
The first filling of the reservoir began October 3, 1975. The rate
of filling of the reservoir was about a foot per day in the early
stages; however, it was increased to about 3 ft per day for the
most part of May and June 1976. When the dam breached on
June 5, 1976 the reservoir had reached only El.5301.7 ft, which
was about 22 ft less than the design full pool elevation.

On or before June 3, 1976 (Reservoir level was at or below El.
5297 ft), no unusual signs of distress or springs or other
increased seepage were noticed downstream of the dam. On June
4, minor evidence of clear seepages appeared downstream, a
good distance of 1300-1500 ft from the toe, which was consistent
with the raising of the ground water regime due to rising
reservoir water level. Late in the evening of June 4 (Reservoir
El.5300ft), some dampness was noticed in the right abutment
slope at El. 5200 ft. The following morning on June 5 shortly
after 7:00 AM (Reservoir El.5301.3 ft) some muddy water was
first observed to be flowing from the junction of the embankment
and the abutment at El. 5200ft. At 10:30AM, a large leak of
about 15 cfs appeared with a “burst” on the downstream at EL
5200.0ft. The leak appeared to emerge from a tunnel of about 6 ft
in diameter from inside the embankment and roughly
perpendicular to the dam axis at Sta. 15+25. At about 11:00AM,
a vortex appeared in the reservoir near Sta. 14+00 above the
upstream slope of the embankment. At 11:30 AM, a sinkhole on
the downstream slope (El. 5315.0 ft) developed near the crest
and above the leaky tunnel. At 11:55AM, the crest of the dam
began to collapse between the vortex and the sinkhole, leading to
a full breach at 11:59AM (IP 1976).
CONCEPTS OF THE NEW THEORY
Past failure investigations of Teton have paid little attention to its
fundamental soil mechanics aspects. We believe that the failure
of the Teton dam belongs to a special class of rapid failures
brought about by some locations of the highly compacted soils
reaching a state of fracture. This fracture state is best addressed
by the principles of state based soil mechanics (Pillai and
Muhunthan 2001, 2002). The origins of the state based soil
mechanics approach lie in the modern concepts of critical state
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soil mechanics (CSSM). Detail accounts of the CSSM
principles, the features, and finite element applications have been
presented in a number of publications (Schofield and Wroth,
1968, Schofield, 1980, Muhunthan and Schofield, 2000). Soil
behavior under shear stresses including rapid failures is
described in CSSM using a normalized state space or
equivalently using a normalized space of liquidity index and
mean stress. Both approaches are considered here.

RUPTURE AND FRACTURE BASED ON “ STATE OF
SOILS”
Aggregates of grains that form natural and man-made soil
deposits exhibit three distinct classes of behavior (Fig. 5); at
large depths, high pressures cause ductile yielding of the
aggregates and the layer of sediments to fold; above these depths
and at lower pressures aggregates rupture and a layer of sediment
faults with the presence of gouge material along the slip planes;
near the surface where the pressure is even lower, a layer of
sediment fractures or cracks.
Fig.-6. Limits of stable states of soils in (a) normalized q/pcrit p/pcristress space stress (b) v – ln p space (Pillai and
Muhunthan,2002) (schematic)
Critical state soil mechanics divides the soil behavior at limiting
states into three distinct classes of failure; the limiting lines OA
and OG (Fig. 6a) indicate states of soils undergoing fractures or
cracks; AB and GE indicate that Hvorslev’s Coulomb faults on
rupture planes; BD and ED indicate Cam-clay yield and fold of a
sediment layer.

Fig. 5. Folds, faults and fissures in sedimentary deposits
(Muhunthan and Schofield, 2000) (schematic)
Critical state soil mechanics captures these simple depositional
and structural phenomena of folds, faults, and fractures in soil
and sedimentary as well as man-made deposits in a scientific
manner. It explicitly recognizes that soil is an aggregate of
interlocking frictional particles and the regimes of soil behavior
depend in a major way on its density and effective pressure.
In the critical state framework, the state of soils is defined in a 3D, mean effective normal stress (p), shear stress (q) and void
ratio or specific volume (v) space. Limits to stable states of
yielding are defined by the state boundary surface in the 3-D, pq-e space. The 2-D representations of the normalized state
boundary surface in the q/pcrit - p/pcrit and e - ln p spaces are as
shown in Fig.6.
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Soil states on the crack surface result in the development of
unstable fissures and cracks openings. Heavily overconsolidated
clays and overcompacted sands at low confining stresses could
reach this limiting state. Collapse similar to fracture on the
dilative side can also exist on the contractive domain but outside
the normal consolidation line (Fig.6b). Such states outside the
stable yielding exist in wind deposited loose sands, air pluviated
or moist-tamped sands and result abrupt collapse upon shearing
of these materials (Pillai and Muhunthan, 2001, 2002). For sands
and clayey silts of low plasticity, stable yield behavior occur
only within a narrow band on both the looser and denser side of
the critical state line (Fig.6b).
The “no tension” or “limiting tensile strain” criteria are the most
widely used among the alternative theories to quantify tensile
fracture (Schofield 1980). For the triaxial specimen the no
tension criterion with σ3 = 0 results in p = σ1/3 or q/p = 3 and
leads to vertical split cracks which is the case of line OA. For
horizontally spalling cracks, σ1= 0 results in p = 2/3 σ3, q = -σ3,
or q/p = 1.5 which is the case of line OG. For clays or silty
clays, Schofield (1980) had suggested that the change from
rupture to tensile crack occurs at a pressure p = 0.1 pc, where pc
is the effective confining stress at critical state. This is
equivalent an overconsolidation ratio of approximately 20
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(Fig.6a)
When the effective stress path crosses the crack surface OA, the
soil element begins to disintegrate into a clastic body and
unstressed grains become free to slide apart. In that case the
average specific volume of the clastic mass can increase (large
voids/cracks) and consequently its permeability can increase
significantly and instantly. A significant internal/external shear
stress at low confining stresses can cause the crossover of the
crack-surface OA and a large increase in specific volume. When
such condition occurs, the opening within the soil body may be
an extensive crack or a local pipe or channel. If such opening
(crack/channel) day lights into the water body it could lead to a
free flow of water into the downstream slope.
RUPTURE/FRACTURE BASED ON LIQUIDITY INDEX
AND CONFINING STRESS
Critical state soil mechanics (Schofield and Wroth 1968) has
shown that it is possible to generalize the density or specific
volume axis by converting to a liquidity basis. It was further
shown that the critical pressure is about 5 kPaat the liquid limit
and 500 kPa at the plastic limit. In his Rankine lecture, Schofield
(1980) mapped the remolded soil behavior on a liquidity against
pressure diagram as shown in Figure 7 utilizing the hundred fold
increase in pressure from the liquid limit critical state to the
plastic limit critical state which is two log cycles, so the rupture
band has half the width of PI and will intersect the line p = 5
kPaat LI = 0.5. This intersection is a consequence of putting the
lower limit of Coulomb rupture at p/pcrit= 0.1 (Schofield 1980).
In the LI-p space, clear boundaries exists that separate the
regions of fracture, rupture, and ductile behavior. This is an
independent and convenient approach to separate the states of
fracture/rupture/ductile yield behavior of the soil using its
physical properties.

50 kPa the soil will remain water-tight while deforming. In
contrast a body of soil initially at LI= 0 will undergo fracture at
depths for which p < 50 kPa or about 3 m of the overburden
depth. In other words, the overburden depth should be larger than
3 m to ensure that deformation caused rupture planes (water
tight) rather than open cracks. If LI= -0.25, the depth could be
about 100 kPa or 6 m of depth. In this view the vertical face of
the breach in Teton Dam can be seen as an open fracture in very
strong soil, standing to a near vertical height of 6m or more.
In order to identify the band of behavior in which various states
of soil lie in the LI-p space, Schofield (1980) defined their
equivalent liquidities by projecting these states in the direction
parallel to the critical state line towards the ordinate through p =
5 kN/m2. The equivalent liquidity LI5 can be shown to be LI5 =
LI+1/2 log (p/5) (Schofield 1980). Therefore, the equivalent
liquidity equals liquidity as found in the ground plus a correction
for stress. A value of LI5 of less than 0.5 generally would
indicate the fracture zone. Values of 0.5 to 1.0 represent the
rupture zone. Values larger than 1.0 represent Cam-clay ductile
zone.
The inset of Figure 7 shows the section of the behavior map at
constant p: stress ratios q/p will increase as equivalent liquidity
falls. In the high equivalent liquidity range, stress ratio increases
linearly as liquidity of cam clay falls. The Hvorslev surface gives
the rupture limits which allow higher stress ratios as lower values
of p/pcrit are approached, but at the no tension limits, q/p = 3 in
compression, and –1.5 in extension. There is a general increase
of limiting stress ratio as equivalent liquidity falls, but this is not
a continuous change because there is a change of limiting
behavior from contours yield, to discrete rupture , to fracture of
stiff fissured soil at equivalent liquidity below 0.5 (Schofield
1980).
The above concepts provide two independent approaches to
analyze the cracking of soils particularly in a dam. The first
approach makes use of mechanical properties determined from
triaxial tests and oedometer tests to separate the three regions of
soil behavior, the fractures, the faults, and the ductile yield. The
second approach relies on physical properties, plasticity index,
and liquidity index to identify such regions. The analysis herein
employed both approaches to complement each other.
MATERIAL PARAMETERS

Fig. 7. LI- log p- Liquidity and limits of soil behavior (after
Schofield 1980)
Considering a body of soil initially at LI = 0.5 and subjected to
an elastic compression the map suggests at shallow depths where
p < 5kPa there may be cracks, but for depths where 5 kPa < p <
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A large database of field and laboratory tests carried out during
the post-failure investigations by the IRG and the IP exists in
their reports. The laboratory testing herein was focused on the
verification of some of the index and mechanical properties.
About 1000 lbs of the zone-1 material was obtained from the
remnants of the failed Teton Dam. The material was tested for
physical and mechanical properties in the laboratory. Tests for
physical properties included grain size, plasticity (Atterberg)
limits, and proctor compaction curves. Mechanical tests
included CU triaxial tests on remolded soils, UU triaxial
compression tests, and consolidometer compression curves on
compacted samples at wopt-1, wopt, and wopt+1 to obtain
4

constrained modulus at various confining stress levels.

were drawn.

The soil material that formed the impervious core of the dam
(Zone 1) was derived from aeloian deposits and consisted of a
uniform clayey silt (CL-ML) of low plasticity (PI~4), 80 percent
passing through #200 sieve and about 15% of clay fraction (<2
micron). The average liquid limit (LL) was 23% and plastic limit
(PL) was 19%. These values are plotted in Fig.-8 along with the
idealized family of critical state lines for different soils. It can be
seen that the Zone-1 material conforms well to similar materials
with different plasticity characteristics.

Table 1. Material Parameters
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FEM ANALYSIS OF SOIL STATES AND “CRACK
SURFACE” IN q-p STRESS SPACE
Finite element analyses were carried out for the longitudinal
section of the dam. Longitudinal section was chosen because it
captures all the variation along the bottom profile (berms, slopes,
etc.). Plane strain condition is assumed to prevail along the
section.
The analyses used an elasto-plastic model with modified camclay yield curve (Roscoe and Burland 1968). The CSL line with
a slope M divides the yield curve into two regions, dry and wet
sides. Porous elastic option is used to describe elastic behavior
inside the yield curve. It is assumed valid for small strains (<5%)
and is a nonlinear isotropic model in which the pressure varies as
an exponential function of volumetric strain. The model
parameters used in the analysis are shown in Table 1.
The model had five layers to simulate the construction of the
dam. In the first step, the top four layers were removed and the
remaining layer was analyzed. This was to allow the geostatic
stress field to reach equilibrium with initial conditions, applied
load, and boundary conditions. Subsequently, each layer was
activated strain-free to simulate the construction steps. The
strain free activation scheme was adopted to avoid creation of
strain by the deformation of the previous layer. From the
analysis, the shear stress (q) and the mean stress (p) were
obtained along the longitudinal section and contours of q/p ratio
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Fig. 9. Mapping of the contours of q/p stress-ratios and zones of
potential crack(s) in the Cross-Valley Section

ANALYSIS OF SOIL STATES AND “FRACTURE/
RUPTURE” IN LI5- p SPACE
As described before, the transition of soil behavior from the
crack surface region to stable Hvorslev fault region occurs at an
equivalent liquidity index of 0.5 corresponding to a confining
stress of 0.8 psi or 5 kPa; or zero liquidity index at confining
stress of 8psi (50kPa). Similarly, the Hvorslev-Coulomb rupture
regime changes to ductile Cam-clay regime at 80 psi (500kPa)
(Fig. 7). This was further confirmed by a series of
consolidometer tests with Zone 1 samples compacted at varying
initial liquidity indices. For various confining stresses, the
corresponding equivalent liquidity indices LI5 were determined
and their position in the LI5-p space were identified. This was
transferred to the cross-valley section for the respective
confining stresses. A mapping of the contours of equivalent
liquidity index for the valley crosses section of the Teton dam
was made as shown in Fig. 10.

5

changes in the deformability were further disrupted by the
benches, which apparently caused significant differential
deformations and increased shear stresses at some locations..

Fig. 10. Mapping of the contours of equivalent liquidity index
(LI5) and zones of potential crack(s) in the Cross-Valley Section
DISCUSSION
The state based soil mechanics theory presented here suggests
that zones with stress ratio q/p larger than 3 would indicate the
presence of a vertical split or crack (Fig. 6). Such zones can be
identified for the Teton Zone 1 from the q/p contours shown on
Fig.-9. These results clearly show that at the end of construction
the dam core had developed such vertical cracks at two locations,
Sta.14 + 50 in the right abutment and Sta.26 + 50 in the left
abutment. The cracks at Sta. 14+50 were 32 feet deep from top
of the crest while they were only 10 feet deep at Sta.26+50 (see
Fig. 9). The state based theory further suggests that a contours of
q/p ratio less than 3 would indicate the stable nature of the
compacted soil which is the case for soil elements at depth and
particularly below 32 feet (Fig. 9). Therefore, we conclude that
the failure of the Teton dam was initiated as a result of water
flowing through an open vertical crack on the right abutment
near Sta. 14+50 during the first filling, which slowly eroded the
crack into a large tunnel leading to the major breach.
The zone-1 core was capped by a 3-foot layer of sand and gravel
roadbed which was subjected to continual vibration and
compaction by the vehicular traffic inhibiting cracks in the layer.
Further, the material parameters of the granular bed, their
packing, and the characteristics were different from zone-1
material to exhibit cracking. As a result is was likely that the
cracks below in the core zone apparently might not have daylighted onto the roadbed to be visible during the first filling.
However, numerous transverse cracks day lighted the roadbed in
the left abutment soon after the dam breach, mostly near Sta.
26+50, where the q/p ratio was near or larger than 3 for shallow
depths.
The map of the contours of liquidity independently confirms the
above conclusions on the initiation of the Teton failure. Fig. 10
indicates shallow depths to about 30 ft between Sta. 14+00 and
Sta.+ 16+00.
Because of the low plasticity (PI ~ 4), the liquidity index was
very sensitive to placement water content and its influence on the
performance of the soil core, under rapidly changing confining
and shear stress conditions, particularly at the abutments. At the
steep abutments, depth of the soil column decreases;
consequently the soil elements were subjected to decreased
confining stress. In effect, the soil columns in the abutments
were in the Hvorslev regime while those in the valley section of
the dam were in or near the ductile (Cam clay) regime. Again the
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In earth structures such as Teton dam, fill materials are generally
placed at or near the optimum water content to achieve a high
density. The construction specification generally used the
“optimum water content” as the reference point. At this state the
material is partially saturated (80-85%), near plastic limit (PL)
(low liquidity index), has higher stiffness, constrained modulus,
and strength. For this placement condition, the state of soil
(3>q/p> 1.2) remains in the Hvorslev regime of the stress-space
(Fig. 6). However, if the placement water content is increased,
the liquidity index will be increased. Consequently the material
will become less stiff and more ductile. With increased confining
stress or water content, the equivalent liquidity index would
increase and consequently the state of soil can quickly migrate
into the Cam-clay yield regime (1.2>q/p>0). The soil would then
deform with positive pore water pressure response. Because of
the low plasticity index of the Teton core (Zone-1), small
changes in water content played a significant role in altering its
liquidity index and the mechanical properties including the
potential for cracks/rupture and ductility.
The concepts presented may also help explain some of the
misgivings of previous investigations. We believe that the
hydraulic fracture ((Seed et al, 1976, Sherard, 1987) and its
relevance to the failure of the dam is fundamentally flawed (See
also Muhunthan and Schofield 2000). Except for the shallow
depths of 30 to 35 feet in some location, the q/p stress ratio is
significantly lower than 3 (fracture level), which indicates
fracturing of the soil would be difficult with increasing depth
(Fig.-9). For hydraulic fracture to occur, the soil element must
be subjected to seepage water, which can cause (a) physical
wetting of the soil first and then (b) a corresponding hydraulic
pressure in the soil. The physical wetting and saturation of the
soil increases the liquidity index of the in-situ soil and
consequently the soil element becomes more ductile and the
material tighter and less permeable (Fig.7) (also the q/p ratio
drops off quickly, Fig.6a). That is the stress-path moves
significantly to the right to a more ductile and stable yield (Camclay) regime. Some researchers (Leonard and Davidson, 1984)
characterized this phenomenon as “collapse on wetting”, which
is a misnomer considering that the stress path simply migrated
from the stable Hvorslev regime to the stable ductile Cam-clay
regime. On the second point, (b), the hydraulic pressure due to
the water seepage would have a limited opposite effect of
reducing the effective stress of the soil element. Any such
reduction in effective stress due to the seepage pressure will be
more than offset by changes in the mechanical properties
(ductility) of the soil. The net effect is that the movement of the
stress-path of the soil element is to the right and towards the
Cam-clay regime (Fig. 6). Therefore the notion of “hydraulic
fracture” by water pressures equal or less than the reservoir head,
which could initiate a failure of the dam has no scientific basis.
We also conclude that the “wet seam” theory postulated during
post-failure investigations (Leonards, 1987, Hilf, 1987) is
fundamentally flawed. The majority of the core material on
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Zone-1 was placed at a negative liquidity index (0.25 – 0.50) or
in the Hvorslev regime in the stress-space (Figs. 6, 7). When
seasonal rains and snow condition interrupted the material
placement during construction, some layers might have been
placed at wetter than the average or near liquidity index of unity.
When subjected to large stresses, such pockets of material would
fall into the Cam clay ductile regime and deform like potter’s
clay, “wet-seams” or wet-pockets producing positive pore water
pressure. This was the case for a few random pockets/layers of
fill that were affected by the rain/snow when full stripping and
replacement of such layers were not possible during the
construction. Although such layers were of low strength and
stiffness, they provide more impermeable mass relative to the
surrounding material and would have had no adverse effect on
the performance of the dam.
The original design specifications of Teton dam stipulated
placement water content of optimum minus 1% to optimum for
the core which had only a small plastic index (PI<4). Based on
our analysis, we believe that this was the fundament error in the
design concept in leading to the demise of the dam. The
placement water content represented an initial liquidity index of
zero or negative, which allowed considerable depth of the core to
be prone to fracture (Fig. 10). Without compromising the
compacted density, for this material an additional one to two
percent water content would have provided adequate equivalent
liquidity index of at least 0.5 or more for most of the placed fill.
This would have kept the entire fill intact in the Hvorslev regime
where the material would have been stiffer, stronger and water
tighter except for the top 5 to 10 feet (freeboard regime).
Therefore, it is evident that the lack of knowledge at that time of
the combined effect of liquidity and confining stress in
controlling the mechanical behavior of Zone 1 contributed in a
major way to the Teton dam failure. For the design of earthstructures, the theory based on the “state based soil mechanics”
provides a better understanding of the physical and mechanical
behavior of a broad spectrum of soils including that of Teton
dam, which are subjected to different loading conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
A new theory is postulated for the failure of Teton dam based on
the concepts of fundamental soil mechanics. Based on our
investigation and discussion, it can be concluded that:
1. A transverse crack(s) or large opening(s) had developed
in the core (Zone-1) to a maximum depth of 32 feet
below the crest (top of the core) at the right abutment
near Sta. 14+00. The analysis further indicates that
much shallower cracks existed in the core in both
abutments under the steep rock slopes. When the
reservoir level rose to the level of the deepest crack,
water flowed freely barreling downstream into the
chimney drain (Zone 2).
2.

The internal cracks might not have day lighted through
the 3-ft thick granular roadbed which was subjected to
constant vehicular traffic and compaction. Also, the
parameters that affected the core were different from
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those of the overlying roadbed granular fill.
3.

The uniform clayey silt (CL-ML) that was used for the
core of Teton dam fitted well into the CSSM model that
was developed for other soils with different plasticity.
Although the clayey silt had relatively high values for
the liquid limit (LL~23) and plastic limit (PL~19), the
plastic index was relatively small (PI~4 or less).
Consequently the liquidity index was very sensitive to
the initial placement water content and its subsequent
changes in mechanical properties due to varying
confining stress. This phenomenon was a significant
contributor to the cracking of the dam. Therefore, for
clay-silt cores, it is more prudent to have the
construction specification refer the “placement water
content” with respect to the plastic limit (PL), than of
the optimum water content.

4.

A combination of material parameters such as the low
plasticity of the core, the sensitivity of the liquidity
index of the material to water content, its variation
under the subsequent confining stress condition, and
their influence on the constrained modulus played a key
role in the cracking of the core. It appears that these
aspects of fundamental soil mechanics and the
phenomenon of cracking were not recognized in the
original design of the dam.

5.

The theoretical models based on “state based soil
mechanics” used in this study provides a better
scientific understanding of the mechanical behavior
(stress-deformation) relating to the initial state of soil in
the stress-space and the physical properties such as
liquidity index and water content.
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